Public money as a store of value, heterogeneous beliefs, and banks: implications of CBDC

9Appendix B: a mixed portfolio

9.1Baseline model

Let cE denote the consumption of impatient depositors (who consume at t = 1), cL the consumption of patient depositors (who consume at t = 1 or t = 2) in case of no bank run, cR the consumption in case of a bank run. Consider a single atomistic consumer who considers holding a share d0 ? [0,1] of her endowment as deposits and a share (1 - d0) as cash. Her portfolio allocation problem, given a run-prone deposit contract, is given by

,

subject to

,

The first order condition for a given deposit contract equals

(31)

Expression 31 can result in either corner solution or an interior choice for d0, depending on q. Certainly, when q is sufficiently low, consumers only hold deposits.

However, the deposit contract is affected by deposit funding. The bank’s problem in the version of the baseline model that allows for mixed portfolios is given by

,

subject to

x + y + yl = D0,

,

cBR = y + yl,

,

where

,

, (32) , (33)

cR = cBR + (1 - f)(1 - D0), (34)(35)

With an intermediate q, consumers may opt for some cash holdings (a mixed portfolio) in which case aggregate deposit funding D0 would be lower and the bank optimally offers adjusted payoffs, similar to in Ennis and Keister (2003). In other words, in equilibrium the consumer’s problem and the bank’s problem are simultaneously determined. Panel (a) of Figure (14) uses a simulation to illustrate the run-prone contract consumers may choose for a mixed portfolio at an intermediate q. Panel (b) confirms that at some intermediate q a mixed portfolio results in a higher expected utility, given that the contract is run-prone. Panel (b) also shows that, under this calibration, the run-proof contract is always preferred over a linear combination of the run-prone contract and cash holdings and. That is, in this case, the same results apply regardless of whether mixed portfolios are allowed or not.

Figure 14: Baseline model mixed portfolio

(a) Portfolio choice (b) Expected utility

0 0.2 0.4 0 q^ 0.2 0.4 q q

deposit share

run-prone run-prone & mixed portfolio run-proof

Notes: The simulations use R = 1.5, ? = 0.3, f = 0.2, and ? = 1.5.

9.2The Model

Consider a single atomistic consumer who considers holding a share d0 of her endowment as deposits and a share (1-d0) as cash. Her portfolio allocation problem given a run-prone contract depends on her belief, and is given by

,

subject to

,

The first order condition equals

(36)

The first term is positive and increasing in d0, whereas the second term is negative and decreasing in d0. Thus, a q1 exists such that when qi < q1 it follows that d0 = 1, a q2 > q1 such that when q1 < qi < q2 it follows that 0 < d0 < 1 where d0 solves optimality condition (36), and when qi > q2 it follows that d0 = 0. Figure (15) uses a simulation to illustrate how consumers with an interior belief choose a mixed portfolio.

Figure 15: Mixed portfolio

Share of endowment invested in deposits

qi

Notes: The simulations use R = 1.5, ? = 0.3, f = 0.2, ? = 1.5, D0 = 0.7, y = 0.26, and —q = 0.05.


Acknowledgements

For helpful comments, we thank Toni Ahnert, Ulrich Bindseil, Eduardo Dávila, Todd Keister, Enrico Perotti, Florian Peters, Rafael Repullo, Javier Suárez, Harald Uhlig, Alejandro Van der Ghote as well as seminar and conference participants at the Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics, Bank of England, European Central Bank, De Nederlandsche Bank, Eurosystem Research Network on Cash (EURECA), University of Amsterdam, and the Working Group on Econometric Modelling of the Eurosystem. We would also like to thank Alejandro Zamora-Pérez for his support with the database. We are fully responsible for all remaining errors.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB, De Nederlandsche Bank or the Eurosystem.

Manuel A. Munoz

European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; email: manuel.munoz@ecb.europa.eu

Oscar Soons

De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; email: o.c.soons@dnb.nl

© European Central Bank, 2023

Postal address 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Telephone +49 69 1344 0

Website www.ecb.europa.eu

All rights reserved. Any reproduction, publication and reprint in the form of a different publication, whether printed or produced electronically, in whole or in part, is permitted only with the explicit written authorisation of the ECB or the authors.

This paper can be downloaded without charge from www.ecb.europa.eu, from the Social Science Research Network electronic libraryor from RePEc: Research Papers in Economics. Information on all of the papers published in the ECB Working Paper Series can be found on the ECB’s website.

PDF ISBN 978-92-899-5997-1 ISSN 1725-2806 doi:10.2866/952376 QB-AR-23-038-EN-N



[1] In particular, the net exchange value of reserves is normalized to unity while cash is subject to storage costs and, hence, its net exchange of value is below one.

[2] The baseline model does not explicitly consider mixed portfolios. For an extension of this model that allows for consumers to simultaneously hold cash and bank deposits, see Appendix B.

[3] Heterogeneous beliefs are commonly used in the field of behavioral finance (Hong and Stein, 2007) to capture disagreement among agents. In practice the objective probability of a state of the world is hard to estimate. Thus, individuals have their corresponding subjective beliefs on which they base their investment decisions (Giglio et al., 2021; Meeuwis et al., 2022).

[4]Niepelt (2020) shows that the required conditions are very restrictive and unlikely to hold in practice.

[5] This cost could correspond to resources spent to prevent theft before its conversion or on other storage and transportation costs.

[6]Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988); Haubrich and King (1990) also assume that the long-term asset yields a zero payoff when liquidated early. In contrast, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume that the liquidation value is equal to the initial investment, while Ennis and Keister (2006); Cooper and Ross (1998) include a liquidation cost ? ? [0,1].

[7] Arguably, in practice, adverse selection explains, among others, why central bank lending and asset purchases are subject to strict risk management frameworks.

[8] Consumers cannot trade at dates t = 1 and t = 2. Jacklin (1987) and Wallace (1988) consider a credit market at date t = 1.

[9] Given the assumption that the long-term investment technology has no liquidation value at t = 1, these resources amount to the reserves held by the bank.

[10] In theory, even when beliefs are private information, the bank could offer a continuum of deposit contracts, permitting each depositor to self-select her preferred option based on her subjective beliefs. Allowing for such a technology would translate into a lower but still positive demand for cash as long as the deposit contracts offered by the bank are run-prone. Note that a representative bank cannot simultaneously offer run-prone and run-proof contracts. 11

Without loss of generality and for the sake of tractability, we have assumed that at t = 0 each individual places her endowment either in cash or in deposits. See Appendix B for the general version of the consumer’s problem which allows each consumer to simultaneously allocate a positive proportion of her endowment in both

[11] Recall from section 4.1 that a greater value of ? implies a greater dispersion in beliefs but does not affect the mean of the distribution.

[12] Optimality condition (9) indicates that the share of bank reserves, y, is strictly decreasing in —q.

[13] Note that we ignore any feedback effects of bank’s portfolio choices on the probability of a bank run, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

[14] In The Model with CBDC, all monetary instruments issued by the central bank, including CBDC, solely serve as a store of value. The study of the implications of CBDC as a means of payment is beyond the scope of this paper. 18

Note that, in practice, the extent to which CBDC is a technologically superior store of value in advanced economies will crucially depend on design features for which no decisions have been made yet. In practice, and given certain distinctive features of cash (e.g., anonimity, resilience), it should not be ruled out a situation in which - under certain conditions - CBDC is a comparatively less attractive storage technology.

[15] In The Model with CBDC the interest rate on CBDC holdings cannot be strictly positive since the central bank would not have revenues to cover the related expense.

[16]Bindseil (2020); Bindseil and Panetta (2020) include a policy proposal aimed at avoiding excessive CBDC holdings and discouraging the use of CBDC as a form of investment via CBDC quantity limits and dissuasive remuneration.

[17] In practice, all central banks in advanced economies have emphasized that CBDC would complement cash and the use and acceptance of cash would continue to be supported (see, e.g., BIS (2020)

[18] Theoretically, there could be a fourth type of agent; public money holders who fully replace cash with deposits. However, we know that - by revealed preference - no cash holder would respond by switching to deposits since they already had that option before the introduction of CBDC.

[19] This case could be interpreted as one in which a paternalist social planner knows what is best for society and does it regardless of consumers’ individual behaviour.

Zařazenost 29.03.2023 11:03:00
ZdrojECB Publication
Originálecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2801~f906c36f0b.en.pdf

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