Remarks by Commissioner Várhelyi in AFET to present the 2023 Enlargement Package

Remarks by Commissioner Várhelyi in AFET

Honourable members,

I understand, that we will also have the chance to discuss this topic later today at the Plenary.

Without further due, I am here to present you with the enlargement package that we have adopted just now. We have not only the ten country reports, first time ever that we have 10 countries reported – but also a Growth Plan for the Western Balkans.

First I want to start with the recommendations that we are making in our report.

The Commission recommends that the Council opens accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. We also recommend opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved. And further, we recommend to grant candidate status to Georgia on the understanding that certain steps are taken.

For Ukraine and Moldova we also recommend that the Council adopts the negotiating framework once Ukraine and Moldova have advanced on pending laws on anti-corruption, verification of assets and undertaken further steps on deoligarchisation. Both will have to continue to fight against corruption by building a further track record of corruption investigations and convictions.

On national minorities, Ukraine needs to address the remaining Venice Commission recommendation from June 2023 and October 2023 linked to the law on national minorities. Ukraine also needs to address the Venice Commission recommendations linked to the laws on state language, media and education.

In the case of Ukraine and Moldova, the Commission will continuously monitor the progress and compliance in all areas related to the opening of negotiations and report back to the Council by March next year (2024). We are ready to start preparatory work, in particular the analytical examination of the acquis (the so-called screening) and the preparation of the negotiating framework.

In Georgia, we have seen positive new dynamics of engagement with the EU in the recent months, specifically on the twelve priorities.

Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Council grants Georgia the status of a candidate country on the understanding that further steps are taken on fighting disinformation, on alignment with CFSP, improving implementation of parliamentary oversight, addressing the issue of political polarisation, deoligarchisation and anti-corruption

Turning now to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Last year's candidate status brought much needed dynamism. New governments have been set up swiftly after the elections at all levels and they have started to deliver on the reforms. The public commitment of political parties to the strategic goal of European integration brought positive results. The Council of Ministers endorsed a set of draft laws, notably on integrity in the justice system; torture prevention (by designating the Ombudsman as national preventive mechanism); the law on foreigners; the freedom to access to information. These were adopted by the Parliament. The Europol contact point has started to function, which was a much-awaited progress. Some progress was made on the alignment with CFSP and Bosnia and Herzegovina significantly improved its alignment with EU foreign policy.

Further, I could continue with a long list of positive developments over the past year: important strategies that have been adopted on anti-money laundering, action plans on migration and terrorism or the implementation of the national war crimes processing strategy. The state budget for 2023 was adopted already in March, the legal basis for conducting negotiations on the southern and eastern gas interconnections, and the cooperation agreement with Eurojust were adopted as well as two regional mobility agreements were ratified.

The Commission encourages the political leaders and all authorities to continue the positive track-record, to redouble efforts to address all remaining key priorities. The Commission recommends the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved. Therefore we are ready and we will report to the Council on progress made by March next year (2024).

Before turning to Albania, let me say a few words on the screening process with both countries, Albania and North Macedonia. The process is progressing smoothly, and the authorities have shown a high level of commitment.

In Albania the implementation of the comprehensive justice reform continued, and the vetting process is advancing at a very satisfactory pace. The Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (the so-called SPAK) achieved further concrete results. Full alignment with common foreign and security policy was a strong signal of the country's strategic choice of EU accession. Our objective is to open the First Cluster on the fundamentals still before the end of the year with Albania.

In North Macedonia, the authorities have continued to demonstrate and to declare publicly their commitment to advancing on their EU path. Now that the accession negotiations process has begun, the pace of EU-related reforms needs to pick up.

Some changes to the criminal code, affecting a large number of high-level corruption cases, have raised concerns. Strengthening trust in the justice system and addressing corruption, including through a solid track record in the investigation, prosecution and final conviction of high-level corruption cases is of key importance.

Parliament and government is committed to launch and achieve as a matter of priority the relevant constitutional changes. We hope all parties will support it to move forward. This is a sovereign decision of North Macedonia and is a sovereign commitment, which will further strengthen fundamental rights.

Montenegro: While progress on EU accession reforms has largely stalled, the newly-appointed government must now focus on EU-related reforms and ensure that the country's democratic institutions and judiciary become once more fully functional.

Meeting the interim benchmarks set in the rule of law Chapters 23 and 24 will be key to achieve further progress in the negotiations overall. No further chapters will be provisionally closed before this milestone is reached.

On both Kosovo and Serbia are urged to engage more constructively in the EU facilitated dialogue through the implementation of the agreement on the path to normalization and the implementation of its annex as well as other previous agreements reached in the EU facilitated dialogue without any further delay or precondition. This includes the establishment of the association of community of Serb majority municipalities and normalization of relations is an essential condition on the European path for both parties.

Kosovo has progressed in legislative work and adopted an important electoral reform. Kosovo continued to align with the EU on condemnation of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and to adopt restrictive measures.

The situation in the north of Kosovo has been affected by several crises, with the latest one being the attack against Kosovo police on 24 September.

Due to the lack of decisive steps to de-escalate, since June the EU has been implementing measures vis-à-vis Kosovo, which also impact financial support. These measures are temporary, and they are dependt on the steps taken to de-escalate the tensions in the north of Kosovo.

Finally, we look forward to 1 January next year (2024), when visa liberalisation for Kosovo will enter into effect.

Serbia started implementing the 2022 constitutional amendments to strengthen the independence of the judiciary. It also adopted important media laws in October 2023 before the dissolution of the Parliament.

Our assessment in the last two reports that Serbia has fulfilled the opening benchmarks for cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth) remains valid. The Commission supports Serbia's ambition to open new accession clusters, on the basis of continuing reform progress.

We also acknowledge good cooperation on prevention of sanctions circumventions, while the key issue of alignment with CFSP, including sanctions against Russia, remain a concern.

Let's turn now to the Western Balkans Growth Plan and the new Facility.

The aim of the plan is to boost the economy of the Western Balkans in the next years in order to close the socio-economic gap between the Union and our partners, by the end of this decade.

We want to gradually integrate the Western Balkans into the EU's Single Market, even prior to full EU membership.

Secondly, we also aim to boost economic integration within the Western Balkan region through the Common Regional Market based on EU standards and rules.

The Growth Plan will help our Western Balkan partners to accelerate fundamental reforms, including the rule of law and democracy. They are needed for the swift roll-out of the Growth Plan itself and attract private investments, promote sustainable economic growth, and reduce pollution.

Lastly, we want to increase the financial assistance to help our partners to speed up the reforms through a Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans. This is a EUR 6 billion package in which EUR 2 billion in non-repayable support (grants) and EUR 4 billion in favourable loans. Adding the Growth Facility to the assistance under IPA III will provide the Western Balkans with roughly the same aid intensity per inhabitant as cohesion policy does on average in the EU.

The longer-term objective is to help the region to achieve its full potential in terms of economic and social development capacity compared to EU Member States by 2030.

The funds will be released upon delivery of Reform Agendas that our Western Balkans partners will have to draw up and which need to be agreed with us and be implemented during the period 2024-2027. They will be related to socio-economic reforms and fundamentals. A stronger conditionality that this House has been advocating for.

In short, the Growth Plan will create the right conditions for our regional partners to become members of the Union.

We need your support in particular in ensuring that the proposed regulation establishing the Growth Facility is adopted during this parliamentary term. I am ready to work with you on that in the next months. Our partners need our support and I am sure together we can deliver for them.

Let me finish with Türkiye. Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner for the EU. Its accession negotiations remain at a standstill since June 2018 in line with the decisions of the European Council as Türkiye continued to move away from the EU.

We conclude that the country has not reversed the negative trend of moving further away from the EU, and our concerns persist over backsliding in the areas of democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary.

Bilateral relations between Greece and Türkiye improved after the February earthquakes and Türkiye did not engage in unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is of paramount importance that Türkiye actively supports the negotiations for a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and in line with the EU acquis and the principles on which the EU is founded.

Cooperation with Türkiye in areas of joint interest continued in essential areas such as counter-terrorism, economy, energy, food security, migration and transport. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. As you know, the Commission and the High Representative will submit a report to the European Council in November 2023, so this month, in which we will set out further options to develop this relationship.

Thank you for your attention.