



European
Commission

ISSN 2443-8014 (online)

In-Depth Review 2024

The Netherlands

INSTITUTIONAL PAPER 274 | MARCH 2024

EUROPEAN ECONOMY



*Economic and
Financial Affairs*

European Economy Institutional Papers are important reports analysing the economic situation and economic developments prepared by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, which serve to underpin economic policy-making by the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in unofficial documents do not necessarily represent the views of the European Commission.

LEGAL NOTICE

Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the European Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication.

This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from
https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/ecfin-publications_en.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024

PDF ISBN 978-92-68-13775-8 ISSN 2443-8014 doi:10.2765/112050 KC-BC-24-001-EN-N

© European Union, 2024

Reuse is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. The reuse policy of European Commission documents is regulated by Decision 2011/833/EU (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). For any use or reproduction of material that is not under the EU copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.

CREDIT

Cover photography: © iStock.com/Teka77

In-Depth Review 2024

The Netherlands



The Netherlands

In-Depth Review 2024



This in-depth review presents the main findings of the Commission's staff assessment of macroeconomic vulnerabilities for the Netherlands for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. It provides technical input to the Commission for the Communication "European Semester – 2024 Spring Package" that will set out the Commission's assessment as to the existence of imbalances or excessive imbalances in the Netherlands. That Communication will be published in June 2024. The current version has been presented and discussed with the Member States in the Economic Policy Committee of the Council.

This publication reproduces staff working document SWD(2024) 82 final, that was discussed with Member States in the Economic Policy Committee of the Council on 20 March 2024.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction.....	1
2. Assessment of macroeconomic vulnerabilities	2
Assessment of the gravity, evolution and prospects of macroeconomic vulnerabilities.....	2
Assessment of MIP-relevant policies	12
Conclusion	16

1. INTRODUCTION

This in-depth review (IDR) analyses the evolution of the Netherlands' vulnerabilities related to high private debt levels and a large current account surplus, which has cross-border relevance, and possibly newly emerging risks. This year's IDR, which follows the 2024 Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) published in November 2023, assesses the persistence or unwinding of the vulnerabilities identified last year, potential emerging risks, and relevant policy progress and policy options that could be considered for the future ⁽¹⁾. Given the size of the Dutch economy and its interlinkages with the other EU Member States, these vulnerabilities have a cross-border relevance.

The vulnerabilities in the Netherlands are analysed in the context of a slowdown in domestic demand and tighter financial conditions ⁽²⁾. Following strong growth in the post-pandemic years, the Dutch economy contracted in the first three quarters of 2023. The impact of high inflation rates on households' disposable incomes resulted in a significant decrease in private consumption spending. At the same time, export volumes decreased. However, the labour market remained strong, with the unemployment rate still at a historically low level and with significant increases in wage growth. Nominal wages grew by 6.2% in 2023, leading to a recovery in real wages. The Dutch labour market continues to be tight, with vacancies exceeding the number of unemployed persons, and several sectors experiencing labour shortages. Overall, GDP growth in 2023 is estimated at 0.2%. HICP inflation has come down significantly from 11.6% in 2022 to 4.1% in 2023. According to the Commission's winter 2024 interim forecast, GDP growth is expected to be 0.4% in 2024 and to pick up to 1.6% in 2025. That upswing is expected to be driven by a further recovery in private consumption and an improved outlook for trade. Private consumption is set to recover somewhat in 2024, as real wages pick up due to falling inflation rates and strong nominal wage growth. Private investment is forecast to remain weak due to labour shortages and the tightening of financial conditions. The main uncertainty regarding the economic outlook concerns a further worsening of that link.

A high level of integration with Germany and non-EU partners makes the Netherlands prone to spillovers resulting from economic developments in these economies ⁽³⁾. The Dutch economy is highly dependent on imports of German and Belgian goods and services ⁽⁴⁾, while

⁽¹⁾ [European Commission \(2023\), Alert Mechanism Report 2024, COM\(2023\) 902 final](#); and [European Commission \(2023\), Alert Mechanism Report 2024, SWD\(2023\) 901 final](#).

⁽²⁾ Forecast figures for GDP growth and inflation come from the Commission Winter 2024 Interim Forecast (European Economy, Institutional Paper 268). All other forecast data used in the IDR come from the Commission Autumn 2023 Forecast (European Economy, Institutional Paper 258), unless stated otherwise, and all calculations are carried out using these data to ensure the coherence of their various components. The cut-off date for the data for the preparation of this IDR was 20 February 2024. Actual outturn data that have become available after the Autumn and Winter interim forecasts, and before the cut-off date for the IDR, are used and supersede figures from those forecasts.

⁽³⁾ In the context of the multiple disrupting shocks that affected the world economy and the EU in the past few years, the Commission Services have run an exercise to estimate the spillovers and the degree of exposures of Member States' economies to various partners and industries, in terms of nominal trade, value-added trade, inflation and financial assets. See European Commission Institutional Paper 2024 (forthcoming) – Economic spillovers and exposures in the EU.

⁽⁴⁾ Germany and Belgium account for 18.7% and 11.7% of the Netherlands' imports, while Germany and Belgium account for 27.6% and 12.6% of Dutch exports, respectively.

Germany and Belgium are major destinations for the Netherlands' exports. However, dependency on exports to Germany and Belgium has fallen over time as the Netherlands has diversified its export markets. When it comes to external demand, the largest shares of total value added in the Dutch economy are generated to satisfy domestic demand in Germany and France, while Dutch domestic demand is mostly satisfied by value added generated in Germany and the US. Cross border Dutch banking interlinkages are particularly high with Germany, France, the US and UK. As the Netherlands' exposures, directly or indirectly, to non-EU partners are high, geopolitical and trade tensions appear to pose a non-negligible risk to its economy.

2. ASSESSMENT OF MACROECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES


For many years, the Netherlands has been marked by high private debt levels and a large current account surplus. The sizeable current account surplus is to some degree reflective of the Netherlands' role as an attractive location for multinationals but also of relatively low domestic investment in some sectors of the economy. Its persistence has hindered debt rebalancing at the euro area level. A high level of household debt has made households and the economy vulnerable to economic shocks – including to interest rate rises – and has been connected to an overvalued housing market. While the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio has been falling, it remains high, although a large share of the intra-group debt of multinationals has mitigated the associated risks.

Assessment of the gravity, evolution and prospects of macroeconomic vulnerabilities

Current account surplus

The Netherlands' current account surplus continues to be among the highest in the euro area. The current account stood at 9.3% of GDP at the end of 2022, below the historically high level of 12.1% recorded in 2021 but significantly above the level suggested by fundamentals which stood at 1.8% of GDP in 2022 and 2023 (Table 2.2). In 2023, the surplus recorded a small increase, coming in at 10.1% of GDP at the end of the third quarter. The high surplus is largely driven by a consistently high trade surplus of between 10% and 11% of GDP in recent years, and unlike most other EU countries, was largely unaffected by worsening terms of trade in 2022 (Graph 2.1). While the physical goods balance dropped throughout 2022, the headline surplus was supported by increasing net exports in merchanting and services. In the third quarter of 2023, the goods balance accounted for 8.6 percentage points of the surplus, while net services exports contributed 2.6 percentage points. Since 2015, there has been an upward trend in net services exports, driven mainly by manufacturing services, transport, telecommunication, and a decline in the net imports of travel services. Primary incomes have dropped back into deficit territory after driving the strong increase in the current account balance during 2021.

Graph 2.1: **Evolution of external position**



Source: Eurostat, Ameco, ECB and European Commission calculations.

Unit labour costs in the Netherlands grew faster than those in the EU and the euro area in 2023 and are expected to do so again in 2024. Nominal unit labour costs have grown by 7.2% in the Netherlands in 2023 according to the Commission's 2023 autumn forecast, compared to a rate of 6.4% in the EU and 6.0% in the euro area. Based on wage negotiations, they are expected to stay above EU and euro area averages in 2024 before returning to the EU and euro area growth rates in 2025. However, as nominal wages are only reacting sluggishly to the inflationary shock in 2022, the Netherlands' real effective exchange rate based on unit labour costs did not appreciate as strongly as those of other EU economies, like Belgium, France or Germany. A substantial drop in the competitiveness of Dutch exports compared to peer economies is therefore not expected.

After 2 years of net borrowing, the general government achieved a balanced budget in 2022. Net lending by the government continued to stay close to zero in the first three quarters of 2023. The government deficit is projected to increase to 1.8% in 2024 and 2% in 2025. Government investments as a share of GDP are on a slow downward trend, decreasing from 4.2% in 2010 to 3.1% in the second quarter of 2023. This contrasts with the ambitious public investment plans of the outgoing government that have not been fully implemented. In 2022, about EUR 6 billion (about 0.6% of GDP) of planned expenditure in the budget was not spent.

Net lending by the corporate and household sector has fallen since the end of 2021. The drop in net lending by the corporate sector from 8.9% of GDP at the end of 2021 to 7.3% of GDP in the third quarter of 2023 was largely driven by a 1.8 percentage point drop in net lending by non-financial corporations. In contrast, net lending by financial corporations has significantly increased since 2020 and is stable at around 3.4% of GDP since the end of 2021. Like corporations, households are consistently saving more than they invest, although Dutch households only have marginally higher net savings than other EU and euro area countries on average. As in other Member States, household savings have reached record highs in 2020 and 2021, linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. While these have come down in the Netherlands, net lending by households is

still somewhat above pre-COVID levels. Relatively high pension contributions, also supported by tax incentives, are a structural driver of household savings in the Netherlands. These savings are then predominantly invested abroad by pension funds. While the Dutch pension system performs very well in providing adequate incomes to households after retirement, the relatively high mandatory contributions, in combination with tax incentives in favour of debt-financed homeownership, limit the ability of many households to weather income shocks due to insufficient liquid assets and could increase their vulnerability to such shocks ⁽⁵⁾. Household investments on the other hand, have been moderately increasing since 2015, mostly driven by strong price increases on the housing market.

Corporate and government investments have been held back by, among other factors, severe labour shortages, congested electricity grids and investment bottlenecks created by the need to reduce excessive nitrogen deposits. This particularly impacts investments in residential construction and the green transition. Labour shortage indicators suggest that shortages in services and in professions related to the green transition are particularly pressing and are slowing down the necessary investments ⁽⁶⁾. The congested electricity grid delays residential construction and investments in renewable energy as waiting times for new connections to the grid have increased sharply ⁽⁷⁾. Permitting procedures for residential construction have become lengthier and costlier due to the more stringent requirements on limiting nitrogen emissions after a court ruling in 2022. There is evidence that this has limited the increase in the housing supply in some regions ⁽⁸⁾.

Domestic Dutch multinationals are the largest contributor to the NFC sector's savings surplus, which reached 5.5% in 2021 and fell to 4% in the second quarter of 2023 ⁽⁹⁾. Among non-financial corporations (NFCs), Dutch multinationals are structurally the biggest contributors, although the size of their contribution has varied, which is likely to be linked to the impact of oil prices on Shell's balance sheet prior to the company's relocation in 2021.

Net savings by foreign multinationals in the Netherlands are on an upward trend but are to a large degree the result of the statistical treatment of their retained earnings. The economic activities of these multinationals largely take place within subsidiaries that are located outside the Netherlands but owned by the Dutch holding company. According to internationally agreed standards for balance of payment statistics, their profits are recorded as an inflow of income on direct investments in the Dutch primary incomes balance. Only a part of these profits flows out of the Netherlands to shareholders in the rest of the world through the distribution of dividends. Any retained earnings of these holding companies therefore contribute to the savings of the Dutch corporate sector, even though they do not accrue to Dutch residents in an economic

⁽⁵⁾ Ciurila et. al. (2020), Are the savings of Dutch households optimal?

⁽⁶⁾ ABN AMRO (2023), [Personeelstekort energietransitie rond recordniveau](#)

⁽⁷⁾ Bouwend Nederland (2023), [Bouwprojecten vertraagd door netcongestie. wat te doen?](#)

⁽⁸⁾ Buijs (2023), [Nederland mist 23 000 woningen door stikstofuitspraak](#)

⁽⁹⁾ Net lending by the NFC sector increased strongly to over 13% in 2022 due to an unusually high transaction related to the sale of intellectual property by a Dutch business unit of a foreign multinational to a foreign subsidiary of the same multinational in the second quarter. This transaction was recorded in the capital account, therefore not contributing to the current account surplus.

sense – the shareholders of these firms are often dispersed across the globe. The most recent figures show that foreign multinationals contributed about 1.2% of GDP to the savings surplus of the Netherlands in 2021. In the hypothetical case that balance of payment statistics were to assign these retained earnings to the ultimate owners of the holding company, net savings by the Dutch corporate sector would be somewhat lower. However, fully accounting for the ultimate beneficiaries of retained earnings would, at the same time, increase Dutch households' net savings, as large parts of their pension wealth are invested in foreign firms. Analyses suggest that doing so would therefore mainly shift the savings surplus from corporations to households without major impacts on the headline balance ⁽¹⁰⁾.

The high level of savings by multinationals (both domestic and foreign) can also be explained by those firms' activities abroad, which involve substantial direct investments in foreign countries. Roughly 70% of the NFC sector's direct investments abroad are outside the EU. Additionally, both foreign and domestic firms listed in the Netherlands have tax incentives to prioritise share buybacks over other uses of their retained earnings or the distribution of dividends (see also the assessment of policies relevant to the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP) below). While share buybacks make a positive contribution to the savings surplus in the Netherlands, using these profits to finance investments or to pay out dividends would result in lower savings.

Savings by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are, to some extent, supported by the tax system which incentivises owners of closely held companies to retain earnings. In 2021, SMEs contributed with about 1.8% of GDP to the economy's net savings. Through closely held companies, owners can postpone tax payments by borrowing money from their own firm instead of distributing profits through salary or dividend payments – which would be subject to income taxation at the time of payment or distribution. This possibility of tax arbitrage can distort economic decision-making and the allocation of capital ⁽¹¹⁾. While recent legislation aims to curb these incentives, exemptions remain (see also the policy section below). However, this is unlikely to fully explain the substantially higher savings surplus of Dutch SMEs compared to those in other euro area countries. Compared to the euro area average, Dutch SMEs make less use of external financing, in particular of bank loans, and if they do use external financing, are less likely to do so for the purpose of fixed investments ⁽¹²⁾. Additionally, interest rates for small loans extended to SMEs in the Netherlands tend to be higher than for similar loans in the rest of the EU, despite the comparable financial health of Dutch SMEs (see also the policy section below) ⁽¹³⁾.

Statistics on the Dutch current account have been subject to substantial revisions in recent years. In 2023, data on the primary income balance and net exports have been revised for 2021 and 2022, increasing the headline surplus from 7.3% to 12.1% of GDP in 2021 and from 4.4% to 9.3% of GDP in 2022 ⁽¹⁴⁾. This brings the surplus well above the MIP threshold of 6% of

⁽¹⁰⁾ See Suyker & Wagteveld, 2019; Adler, Garcia-Macia & Krogstrup, 2019.

⁽¹¹⁾ Jacobs (2019), ESB, Fundamentele hervorming van belastingen op kapitaalinkomen.

⁽¹²⁾ ECB, Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises.

⁽¹³⁾ Brouwer et al. (2023), ESB, Midden- en kleinbedrijf betaalt een hogere rente en duidt op marktfalen.

⁽¹⁴⁾ DNB, [Netherlands' current account surplus revised upwards \(dnb.nl\)](https://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/2023/03/01/dnb-revisie-hoofdcijfers-2021-2022).

GDP. Revisions to the figures for net exports are due to higher-than-expected net exports in the merchanting, chemical and automobile sectors in 2021. The upward revision of goods exports in 2022 is largely a base effect of the upward revision in 2021. Primary incomes were revised mainly due to the higher-than-expected profits of listed financial holding corporations located in the Netherlands in 2021 and 2022. These are typically holding companies of large multinationals that do not necessarily have an economic activity in the Netherlands. Non-distributed profits recorded by these corporations were EUR 23 billion higher than estimated in 2021 and EUR 30 billion higher in 2022 ⁽¹⁵⁾.

Despite consecutive current account surpluses, the Netherlands' net international investment position (NIIP) fell from 113% of GDP in 2020 to 68.5% in the second quarter of 2023. While real GDP growth and high inflation explain part of the decrease in the ratio throughout 2022 and 2023, Dutch net foreign assets also decreased in nominal terms. Net direct investments fell by roughly 110 billion EUR between the end of 2021 and the third quarter of 2023 (Graph 2.4), driven by exchange rate movements and valuation changes. Part of the contemporaneous movement of net other investments and net portfolio investments in opposite directions can be explained by pension funds' asset sales to meet margin obligations in 2022. Additionally, the rise in interest rates and falling stock market prices reduced the value of net portfolio investments. Other investments also increased as a result of an increase of about 100 billion EUR over the course of 2022 in the Netherlands' TARGET2 balance ⁽¹⁶⁾.

The current account surplus is expected to remain high. The Commission's 2023 autumn forecast projects a surplus of 9.2% in 2024 and 9.1% of GDP in 2025, as the structural drivers of the surplus, such as weak domestic investments, retained earnings of multinationals and tax incentives for private savings remain in place. Obstacles to domestic investments related to labour shortages, the electricity grid and environmental regulations to curb excessive nitrogen deposits, are also expected to persist.


Private debt

Private debt in the Netherlands fell sharply between 2022 and 2023, continuing the declining trend since its peak in 2014. Private debt is estimated to have fallen from 210% of GDP in 2022 to 193% in 2023, marking a further reduction from its peak of 268% in 2014. The private debt-to-GDP ratio remains above the fundamental benchmark and prudential threshold, as well as EU and euro area averages. The notable reduction in private debt-to-GDP in 2023 was mainly driven by high inflation, which increases the denominator and low net credit growth. Unlike in 2022, real GDP growth was low, contributing little to the decrease in the ratio. Looking ahead to 2024, the expectation is for a more gradual decline, given lower inflation rates. Both corporate debt and household debt remain substantial in the Netherlands (Graph 2.2).

⁽¹⁵⁾ For a detailed description of revisions to net exports and primary earnings, see CBS (2023), [Revisions to GDP and GNI in 2021 and 2022 \(cbs.nl\)](https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/onderzoek-en-publicaties/2023/10/revisions-to-gdp-and-gni-in-2021-and-2022)

⁽¹⁶⁾ DNBB (2022), [Current account surplus dips below 6% standard \(dnb.nl\)](https://www.dnb.nl/en/actualities/2022/09/2022-09-14-current-account-surplus-dips-below-6-percent-standard).

Graph 2.2: **Evolution of debt**



Source: Eurostat, Ameco, ECB and European Commission calculations.

The corporate debt-to-GDP ratio in the Netherlands remains among the highest in the EU but is on a downward trajectory. NFC debt has fallen from its peak of 153% of GDP in 2014 to 104% in 2023. This includes a decline of 14 percentage points compared to 2022. The decline in 2022 mainly reflects denominator effects due to real growth and inflation as credit flows still contributed positively to the ratio by 4.3 percentage points. The picture changed over the course of 2023 with high interest rates leading to a contraction of credit flows, contributing to the drop in the ratio by 1.4 percentage points in the third quarter of 2023. The NFC debt-to-GDP ratio remained above its prudential threshold but is close to its fundamental benchmark in 2023 (see Graph 2.2).

Bankruptcies started to increase, and profits started to decrease after growing strongly in recent years. With some delay after the end of the government's programmes to support firms during the pandemic, bankruptcies increased to pre-pandemic levels at the end of 2023. These levels are, however, still significantly lower than those observed in the early 2010s. Bankruptcies increased particularly strongly in the wholesale and retail trades as well as in accommodation and food services, two sectors that were particularly reliant on government support in 2020 and 2021. Gross profits before taxes of non-financial corporations grew more strongly than GDP in 2021 and 2022 ⁽¹⁷⁾. Since their peak in the third quarter of 2022 at 36% of GDP, they have fallen to 32% of GDP in the third quarter of 2023, only somewhat below the pre-pandemic levels.

Overall, the vulnerabilities related to the high corporate debt-to-GDP ratio are limited and are mitigated by several factors. Corporate debt is dominated by the activities of multinational enterprises located in the Netherlands, which account for around 60% of total NFC debt, with that stock largely consisting of intra-group debt. When multinationals' debt levels are excluded, corporate debt levels in the Netherlands are not particularly high by international standards. The limited risks arising from the high level of headline debt is also reflected in the low

⁽¹⁷⁾ Gross profits before taxes are defined as gross operating surplus plus property income received net of interest and rent paid.

non-performing loans ratio. In line with the relatively limited importance of external financing, the sharp increase in interest rates seems to have had only a limited effect on corporate solvency until now.

Household debt in the Netherlands, as a percentage of GDP, remains high but is on a downward trend. The household debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen continuously since its peak of 118% in 2012, with a notable acceleration in 2023, dropping from 92% in 2022 to 87%. However, it remains the highest in the EU, and above its fundamental (70%) and prudential (47%) benchmarks (see Graph 2.2). When expressed as a share of household gross disposable income (GDI), the debt ratio is particularly high, at 182% of GDI in 2022 (173% in 2023-Q2). The high debt primarily reflects the high level of debt-financed homeownership and large mortgages. Approximately 90% of household debt in the Netherlands is comprised of mortgage debt ⁽¹⁸⁾. Although only 57% of the population owns a house (below the euro area average), 47% of the population has a mortgage, the highest among all euro area countries ⁽¹⁹⁾. The high prevalence of mortgages is a consequence of significant subsidies provided by the tax system that incentivise debt-financed homeownership, particularly the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. This, combined with large mortgages as allowed by the generous borrowing standards of up to 100% of the house value, and a historically high number of interest-only mortgages, has led to increased house prices and high levels of household debt ⁽²⁰⁾ ⁽²¹⁾.

The decline in household debt over the last decade can be attributed to several factors. Stricter macroprudential policies were implemented in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. These included tighter rules governing interest-only mortgages, stricter borrowing standards for new mortgages, and lower mortgage interest rate deductibility. Overall, however, the policies remain lenient. More recently, macroeconomic conditions (real growth in 2021 and 2022, high inflation in 2022 and 2023) reinforced passive deleveraging.

Pressure on indebted households has recently increased due to a strong rise in interest rates. Interest rates on new loans for house purchase rose from 1.6% in December 2021 to more than 4.3% by December 2023. Coupled with a rising share of mortgages with a loan-to-income ratio close to the maximum limit due to the recent high growth in house prices, the higher interest rates could put households with variable and short-term interest rate mortgages, which is however a relatively small group, under debt service stress. Interest-only mortgages could be particularly concerned, as they are more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations. Dutch banks are also more strongly exposed to household mortgages than in other euro area countries, potentially putting banks under strain in case of substantial credit losses from loan defaults (Graph 2.4) ⁽²²⁾.

⁽¹⁸⁾ DNB (2024). Woninghypotheken verstrekt aan huishoudens naar sector.

⁽¹⁹⁾ ECB (2023), the Household Finance and Consumption Survey.

⁽²⁰⁾ In most countries, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios tend to be limited to 80-90% of the house value. Given the high LTV ratio, house price corrections could increase the proportion of underwater mortgages, which have in the past reduced consumption by affected households. See e.g., <https://esb.nu/nederlandse-hypotheckaire-leenruimte-hoog-maar-binnen-europese-kaders/>

⁽²¹⁾ DNB (2022). Overzicht Financiële Stabieleit. The interest-only portion made up 44% of total mortgage debt in Q4-2021.

⁽²²⁾ ESRB (2022) Assessment of the Dutch notification in accordance with Article 458 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 concerning application of a stricter national measure for residential mortgage lending.

Despite the vulnerabilities mentioned above, there are several mitigating factors. Most mortgages in the Netherlands do not have variable interest rates. Between 2015 and mid-2022, around 11% of new mortgages had variable interest rates, while 44% had interest rates fixed for more than 10 years ⁽²³⁾. Consequently, the average interest rate on outstanding loans to households for house purchase increased modestly from 2.3% in July 2022 to 2.6% in December 2023, remaining historically low ⁽²⁴⁾. Another mitigating factor is that nominal wages have grown substantially (with collective labour agreement wages going up by 6.1% in 2023) ⁽²⁵⁾. This wage growth is, however, insufficient to fully counteract the impact on mortgage holders subject to the increased interest rates (and for new mortgage holders), even though the interest rate increase is partially mitigated by the deductibility of mortgage interest. As such, aggregate interest payments increased from around 4.5% of gross disposable income in 2022-Q2 to 6.0% in 2023-Q1 ⁽²⁶⁾. Net interest payments (paid-received) by households (as a percentage of gross disposable income) rose from 4.2% to 5.1% over the same period but started to come down again in 2023 on the back of strong growth in interest received ⁽²⁷⁾. Looking ahead, only 13% of overall mortgage debt will expire in 2024-2025 or is subject to a revision of the interest rate ⁽²⁸⁾. As a result, a relatively limited number of households will experience an increase in the interest burden.

Indebted households in the bottom income quintile are the most vulnerable to increasing interest rates, especially with recent increases in the wider cost of living. Around 47% of households in the bottom quintile of the income distribution in the Netherlands are in debt, with a median debt-service-to-income ratio as high as 41%. These households, which make up around 9% of all households in the Netherlands, are particularly exposed to potential financial difficulties stemming from higher interest rates. However, only around 34% of households in the bottom income quintile own a house (with or without a mortgage), which is the second lowest in the euro area ⁽²⁹⁾, as the majority of low-income households are in the social rental sector, implying that a sizeable proportion of the households have debts other than mortgage debt. Next to this, when looking at households in the lowest wealth decile, data suggests that in contrast to all other deciles, the debt-to-asset ratio has increased since 2021 to 194% (compared to the euro area average of 156% ⁽³⁰⁾), following a period of decline in 2018-2020. These observations indicate that there are pockets of vulnerability. Therefore, while the overall risk posed by the household sector to financial stability remains contained, it deserves continued monitoring in the future.

⁽²³⁾ In reaction to monetary policy tightening, the use of floating interest rate (or with a fixed period less than one year) gained more popularity, increasing to 21% of newly issued mortgages in 2023. DNB (2024). Deposito's en leningen van MFI's aan huishoudens.

⁽²⁴⁾ ECB data on outstanding amounts of loans to euro area residents.

⁽²⁵⁾ CBS (2024) Cao-lonen stegen in 2023 tweemaal zo hard als in 2022.

⁽²⁶⁾ ECB Quarterly Sector Accounts: D41G: interests received by households, before FISIM allocation.

⁽²⁷⁾ These averages conceal a lot of variation across households, as they include households without debt and interest payments.

⁽²⁸⁾ DNB (2023) Overzicht financiële stabiliteit (Najaar 2023). Mortgages subject to a revision in the interest rate include mortgages with variable-interest or short-term fixed-interest rates.

⁽²⁹⁾ ECB (2023) the Household Finance and Consumption Survey.

⁽³⁰⁾ ECB's distributional wealth accounts.

Housing market

The higher interest rates slowed down the Dutch housing market in late 2022 and throughout 2023. As discussed in the previous section, the increase in wages could not fully compensate for the increase in interest rates on new mortgages, resulting in a reduction of the maximum borrowing capacity of households and reducing the demand from households to buy houses with mortgages. This development halted the upward trend in house prices, which had persisted for over a decade and almost doubled house prices. Between 2022-Q3 and 2023-Q3, nominal house prices fell by 3.8% (Graph 2.4). This, together with the increase in wages, has slightly reduced the overvaluation of the housing market. However, according to the Commission's model-based estimations, the housing market was still overvalued by 17.0% in 2023, down from 23.6% in the previous year. Simultaneously, the number of transactions on the housing market in 2023 reached its lowest point since 2015.

However, increasing housing shortages continue to support prices in the housing market.

The estimated housing shortage increased from 315 000 to 390 000 dwellings in 2023. On the demand side, there has been a stronger than expected increase in population, which has pushed the demand for housing, and the mismatch in dwelling and household sizes continues to increase, as households become smaller and older people live longer in their larger homes. On the supply side, the supply of new dwellings remains very inelastic to price changes. The number of new residential building permits issued in 2023 reached its lowest level since 2015. The main bottleneck is limited availability and affordability of locations for residential constructions. There is a lack of greenfield locations in cities for new constructions as the most suitable spots have already been used, following the policy focus on densification. Consequently, the creation of new dwellings often involves the renovation and conversion of brownfield locations, which entails more complicated regulatory requirements as well as higher costs. In addition, there are several other factors that further delay new constructions or reduce their profitability. These include limited centralised planning to address the housing shortages, the current high interest rates rendering some projects unaffordable for potential buyers, the high cost of building materials, labour shortages, and challenges related to the green transition, such as the ruling on excessive nitrogen deposits that limits the issuing of new building permits ⁽³¹⁾ and congestion on the electricity grids.

The private rental market is small and expensive, raising affordability issues for some lower-income households. Unlike (debt-financed) homeowners, who benefit from various tax incentives, or households in the social rental sector, who pay rents below the market price and many of which are eligible for housing allowances, households in the private rental market do not receive equivalent support. The result is expensive and limited private rental options. The private rental sector represents only 14.4% of the total housing stock, a significantly smaller portion than homeowners (57.0%) or households in the social rental sector (28.5%). There are long waiting lists for social rental houses, resulting in some lower income households not being able to find affordable housing, while some middle-income households have no viable alternative than to opt for debt-financed homeownership.

House prices are expected to gradually pick up in 2024 amid housing shortages and the expectation that interest rates have reached their peak. The average +10-year fixed-

⁽³¹⁾ Raad van State (2019). ECLI:NL:RVS:2019:1603.

interest rate for new mortgages has been stabilising since June 2023 at around 3.6-3.7%. Simultaneously, the housing market tightened in the second half of 2023, with more homes sold than listed and faster sales times ⁽³²⁾. Looking ahead, the range of external estimates foresee an increase in house prices between 0.4% ⁽³³⁾ and 4.5% in 2024 ⁽³⁴⁾.

Besides residential real estate (RRE), the Dutch financial sector has a large exposure to commercial real estate (CRE). In previous years, the investment transaction volumes of CRE in the Netherlands were among the highest in the EU (above 1% of GDP annually) ⁽³⁵⁾. While banks had the highest total exposure to CRE in 2023, amounting to EUR 360 billion (CRE loans make up around 7% of their balance sheet) ⁽³⁶⁾, the size of real estate funds (REITs) was also substantial, at EUR 136 billion (16% of the total assets of Dutch investment funds). In addition, Dutch pension funds and insurance companies are indirectly exposed to CRE by holding major parts of the REITs. Industrial facilities represent the main share of the Dutch CRE investment transaction volumes, while offices dominate in many other EU Member States.

While CRE and RRE followed a similar trend of increasing prices for a decade, since the pandemic CRE prices have experienced a significant downward correction ⁽³⁷⁾. Exacerbated by the sharp increase in interest rates over the last year, the decreasing prices have been undermining the interest coverage ratio of Dutch CRE companies. While this increases risks for CRE companies, banks are in a better position thanks to the relatively low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of their CRE loans (around 60%). Instead, insurance companies and pension funds are exposed to losses due to changes in the market value of CRE ⁽³⁸⁾. Prospects are expected to be differentiated across CRE sub-sectors, with retail and non-prime offices continuing their price correction.

Box 1: The Netherlands – Medium-term household and non-financial corporate debt projections.

This Box summarises household and non-financial corporate debt-to-GDP projections for the Netherlands over the next decade, based on scenario analysis to take into account different underlying assumptions.

The corporate debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to increase under the baseline scenario by 3 percentage points until 2033, to 109%. The baseline scenario takes the 2023 forecasts as a starting point and foresees an average real GDP growth of 1.3%, in line with Commission projections, and credit flows of 4% of GDP until 2033 (Graph 2.3). In this scenario, credit flows would be above the credit-to-GDP ratio that would stabilise NFC debt over the projection horizon, at 3.9%. Under an adverse scenario of credit flows that are 2.4% of GDP higher – corresponding to half the intertercile range of the annualised quarterly credit flow-to-GDP ratio over 2018-2023 – the NFC debt-to-GDP ratio would be 21 percentage points higher. A permanent negative 1% GDP growth shock would increase the NFC debt-to-GDP ratio by another 10 percentage points.

The household debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to gradually decrease over the next decade under the baseline scenario. The baseline scenario takes the 2023 forecast of 87% as a starting point, and assumes as determining parameters an average real GDP growth of 1.3% and credit flows of 1.8% of GDP (solidly below the debt-stabilising

⁽³²⁾ NVM (2023). Woningmarkt veert op.

⁽³³⁾ DNB (2023). DNB Najaarsraming

⁽³⁴⁾ 4.0% by ABN AMRO (2024) & 4.5% by Rabobank (2023).

⁽³⁵⁾ ESRB (2023); Vulnerabilities in the EEA commercial real estate sector, January.


⁽³⁶⁾ Compared to 28% related to housing market exposures, de Nederlandsche Bank (2023): Financial Stability Report, autumn 2023.

⁽³⁷⁾ The Dutch real estate funds (REIT) index declined by more than 50% between February 2020 and July 2020.

⁽³⁸⁾ Despite the predominantly open-ended structure of Dutch real estate funds, the redemption conditions are relatively restrictive, which seem to have supported ongoing inflow to real estate funds in the Netherlands.

credit-to-GDP ratio of 3.1%) for the period 2024-2033. It projects that the household debt ratio will gradually decline, at a rate of around 1 percentage point a year, to reach 76% by 2033 (Graph 2.3). Depending on how interest rates and other economic conditions evolve, credit flows could also behave differently. Graph 2.3 considers alternative scenarios on credit flows, which account for country-specific variability in credit flows observed since 2018, and permanent GDP shocks of 1 percentage point above or below the baseline scenario. Under the most adverse scenario considered (high credit flows and low GDP growth), the debt ratio would rise to 89% by 2033, still solidly below the pre-pandemic level (100%).

Graph 2.3: **Household and non-financial corporate debt projections, based on scenario analysis for the Netherlands**



(1) Both for the NFC and household debt projections, the baseline refers to the country-specific median annual credit flow to GDP ratio over 2018-2023. The high/low credit scenario assumes a higher/lower credit flow to GDP ratio, with the difference to the baseline calculated as half the intertertile range of the annualised quarterly credit flow to GDP ratio over 2018Q1-2023Q3. The latter is based on the moving sum of quarterly GDP. The high (low) GDP shock scenario reflects a permanent 1 percentage point increase (or decrease) in GDP growth.

Source: Eurostat, Ameco, European Commission calculations.

Assessment of MIP-relevant policies

Current account balance

Recent policy actions have to some extent affected structural drivers of the current account surplus, but their impact is likely to remain limited. In the corporate sector, under a tax reform in force since January 2023 loans made by a company to one of its directors, who is also a major shareholder, are taxed like dividends. This reform, which became stricter in January 2024, is a concrete step to reduce the incentives for small and medium-sized companies to retain earnings within their own company and to increase incentives for investments, but it remains to be seen whether this will mostly shift part of the savings surplus of small companies to the household sector. Recent policy progress has been limited, as negotiations on the formation of a new government are still ongoing.

The Dutch Parliament has adopted a reform that foresees from 2025 share buybacks to be taxed at rates equivalent to those for dividends. This is expected to reduce the incentives for multinationals to distribute their profits to shareholders through buybacks instead of dividends, which could reduce the amount of retained earnings, and thus net lending by the corporate sector recorded in the Netherlands. It is, however, unlikely that this would increase the domestic investments of the firms affected.

Past efforts to limit the possibilities for companies to make use of the Netherlands as a hub for tax avoidance strategies have been effective. As a result of these efforts, royalty payments flowing through the Netherlands to low-tax jurisdictions have dropped to close to zero, and the transparency of advance tax rulings by the Dutch tax authorities has improved ⁽³⁹⁾. The conditional withholding tax on dividends that entered into force in January 2024 is expected to further reduce the attractiveness of the Netherlands as a conduit country for profit flows. The effects of legislation curbing aggressive tax planning activities in the Netherlands may thus somewhat reduce retained earnings by foreign or domestic multinationals. However, the conduit country status of the Netherlands does not fully explain the country's attractiveness to multinational companies. Other factors, such as the stable business and regulatory environment and the openness of the Dutch economy will continue to provide incentives for multinationals to choose the Netherlands as the location of their headquarters.

Further improving access to and the uptake of external finance by SMEs could improve that sector's investment activities. Interest rates for small loans extended to SMEs in the Netherlands tend to be higher than for similar loans in the rest of the EU, despite the comparable financial health of Dutch SMEs ⁽⁴⁰⁾. Explanations for these patterns are the high market concentration in the Dutch banking sector, the relatively lower risks for banks in the Dutch mortgage market than for loans to SMEs, and information asymmetries regarding SMEs' financial health ⁽⁴¹⁾. SMEs' access to finance could be improved by policies aimed at reducing information asymmetries between companies and banks, such as by introducing a central credit registry for SMEs. Efforts to improve the negotiating position of SMEs vis-à-vis their banks, for example by simplifying switching from one bank to another, could also lower the cost of external finance for those firms and make their investments more profitable.

Obstacles to the implementation of domestic investments remain. In past years, the government found it increasingly difficult to spend budgeted funds earmarked for investments in infrastructure, climate change mitigation and defence, with underspending reaching 1.2 billion EUR in 2022. As described earlier, investments in residential housing and the expansion of the congested electricity grid are particularly pressing. However, these and other efforts in the area of public and private investments continue to be held back by severe labour shortages, waiting times for access to the electricity grid and restrictions on construction due to excessive nitrogen deposits. These obstacles are unlikely to be addressed soon, with nitrogen deposits remaining an environmental and legal concern. New initiatives under discussion may reduce the Netherlands' attractiveness to foreign workers, which could help reduce domestic shortages.

Private debt and housing market

Previous reforms on new mortgages have been of importance in reducing household debt over the past decade. Among other measures, in 2013, rules on interest-only mortgages were

⁽³⁹⁾ Ministry of Finance (2022), [Tax avoidance via the Netherlands significantly reduced thanks to measures](#).

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Brouwer et al. (2023), ESB, Midden- en kleinbedrijf betaalt een hogere rente en duidt op marktfalen.

⁽⁴¹⁾ Van der Wiel et al., 2019. Dutch SME bank financing from a European perspective, CPB Policy Brief.

tightened, as the interest-only portion of a new mortgage was limited to a maximum of 50% and interest payments were no longer tax deductible. A statutory limit on the loan-to-value ratio was also introduced, gradually decreasing from 106% in 2013 to 100% in 2018. Simultaneously, more stringent rules were established on the debt service-to-income ratio of new mortgages. Furthermore, the interest rate deductibility of mortgage interest payments was reduced from 52% in 2014 to 33% in 2023, which, however, will not decrease further in the coming years. Despite these efforts, policies remain overall lenient.

More recent policy actions to address the structural drivers of high private debt have been limited. As included in the Dutch recovery and resilience plan, the tax-exempt status of a gift of EUR 100 000 to individuals aged 18 to 40 to buy a house was phased out in 2023 and 2024. Also, mortgage lending is likely to be reduced by the introduction of the positive cycle neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) for banks on outstanding loans, which is set to increase to 2% by 31 May 2024, and a minimum average risk weight for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements applicable to exposures to natural persons secured by mortgages on residential property located in the Netherlands (in force from 1 January 2022 until 1 December 2024). However, progress overall in addressing structural issues linked to reducing the incentives for debt-financed homeownership, and in tackling the demand and supply side issues in the housing market remained limited. In fact, the reduction in household debt in 2023 can largely be attributed to denominator effects resulting from high inflation.

Some features of the tax system continue to incentivise debt-financed homeownership, exerting upward pressure on house prices amid significant supply shortages. The overall tax system remains supportive of debt-financed ownership, particularly due to the deductibility of mortgage interest payments and the comparatively low taxation on owner-occupied private homes compared to other classes of investment ⁽⁴²⁾. A more level playing field between homeowners and renters in the private sector in terms of tax incentives would facilitate the expansion of the private rental sector and reduce the (mortgage) debt level of households. However, at the same time, the government plans to expand rent controls in the private sector and the increasing possibilities for municipalities to ban buy-to-let purchases may lead to a reduced supply and higher rents in this segment of the housing market ⁽⁴³⁾. Finally, LTV borrowing standards remain high by European standards and up to 50% of new mortgages can still be interest-only ⁽⁴⁴⁾. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) assessed macroprudential policies by the Netherlands to address residential real estate vulnerabilities as appropriate but only partially sufficient ⁽⁴⁵⁾. It recommends that the Netherlands should tighten LTV limits, adjust the methodology for setting debt-service-to-income limits with financial stability objectives in mind, and should continue with policy actions that go beyond the macroprudential remit ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

Considerable structural issues remain to be addressed to alleviate the housing shortage. Future actions will be crucial to ultimately achieve the government's goal of 900 000 new dwellings by 2030. Some progress was made by a measure, which is part of the Dutch recovery

⁽⁴²⁾ The property tax (eigenwoningforfait) falls under Box 1 of the Dutch Tax system, while other types of wealth are taxed at a higher rate under Box 3.

⁽⁴³⁾ Wetsvoorstel betaalbare huur.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ ESB (2023). Nederlandse hypotheekruimte hoog, maar binnen Europese kaders.

⁽⁴⁵⁾ ESRB (2024). Follow-up report on vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sectors of the EEA countries.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ ESRB (2024). Follow-up report on vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sectors of the EEA countries.

and resilience plan, to address bottlenecks in the planning process, the issuing of permits and legal procedures. In addition, EUR 300 million in extra support ('Startbouwimpuls') was made available to constructions in an advanced planning phase that were threatened with coming to a standstill due to the deterioration in economic conditions (e.g. increased interest rates, the high cost of building materials). However, other initiatives were still in the planning when the general election was called, including efforts to assign a more prominent role to the central government in planning new constructions. This is intended to make more land available to ensure a housing supply that is more responsive to demand. From now on, a broader focus beyond densification could be considered, by amending zoning laws to allow more residential constructions outside built-up areas and/or provide increased support to new projects to mitigate the higher costs associated with building within cities.

Policy action to boost investment and the housing supply and address high household debt can help reduce long-standing vulnerabilities. High house prices are related to a muted increase in the housing supply relative to demand and are tied to high household debt. At the same time, insufficient investment relative to savings contributes to the high current account. Removing obstacles such as excessive nitrogen emissions and congestion on the electricity grid (which might take years to solve), are partly covered by commitments in the recovery and resilience plan. Additional steps to remove these bottlenecks could unlock investment in residential construction and renewable energy by making additional permits available, which would help address the savings-investment gap and increase the housing supply. Increasing SME's access to and uptake of external finance could boost their investment activities. Information asymmetries between SMEs and banks could be reduced through a central credit registry for SMEs. In the corporate sector, the existing incentives for directors of small firms to postpone tax payments are likely to keep corporate savings high, despite recent policy progress. To reduce the high level of household debt, tax incentives for debt-financed homeownership (including the mortgage interest rate deductibility) could be reduced and the statutory loan-to-value ratios could be tightened. Housing supply can benefit from additional financial support to new building projects, as also partly included in the recovery and resilience plan, and an increase in available and affordable locations for residential constructions. Moreover, further developing the private rental market could be conducive to housing affordability.

Table 2.1: **MIP-relevant policy progress in the Netherlands**

Vulnerability	Policies enacted since January 2023	Policies in progress since January 2023
Current account surplus	Taxation of share buybacks at the same rate as dividends	Taxation of loans from businesses to their directors or majority shareholders has become stricter Dividends paid out to low-tax jurisdictions are subject to a withholding tax in the Netherlands.
Private debt, in particular household debt, and housing		Continued reduction of the maximum mortgage interest deductibility Reduction in tax-free gift to individuals aged 18 to 40 to buy a home Financial support for constructions in an advanced planning phase ('Startbouwimpuls') Government working on removing bottlenecks in planning processes and permit issuances


CONCLUSION

The Netherlands high levels of private debt and a large current account surplus persist.

The current account surplus stands close to 10% of GDP and is expected to remain high, on the back of a substantial surplus of trade in goods and services. There has been an upward trend in net services exports since 2015, driven by transport and telecommunication services, as well as a decline in the net imports of travel services. From a net savings perspective, all sectors of the economy are contributing to the savings surplus. While investment bottlenecks contribute to the surplus throughout the economy, there are also sector-specific factors at play. The corporate sector's surplus is to a significant degree driven by the NFC sector's activities abroad and the contribution of multinationals' retained earnings. At the same time, investments by SMEs may be held back by the low uptake of and relatively expensive access to external finance. Additionally, tax distortions encourage SMEs and households to save. Private debt relative to GDP has declined considerably but remains above fundamentals and is one of the highest in the EU. The high level of household debt makes households vulnerable to economic shocks, especially given the overvalued housing market, even though immediate risks have been contained so far. Moreover, the increase in interest rates has triggered a correction in the over-valuation of housing prices. The continuous progress in reducing household debt over the past decade is expected to continue (Box 1), even if debt levels are likely to remain high compared to other Member States due to enduring distortions that incentivise debt-financed homeownership. The high level of corporate debt presents a lower risk than the headline numbers suggest, as it is driven to a large degree by the intra-group debt of multinationals.

Policy progress has been limited. Policy action with a potential impact on the high current account surplus has been mainly focused on limiting the incentives for (multinational) corporations to retain earnings. These policies could lower the corporate sector's contribution to the economy's net lending. At the same time, the impact on domestic investment and on the headline current account surplus is expected to be small, and policy action aimed at increasing domestic investment has not been successful. On household debt, the statutory loan-to-value ceiling and mortgage interest deductibility remain generous, despite recent efforts to reduce them. Policy options in the context of the ongoing housing shortages that could be considered include reducing tax incentives for debt-financed homeownership; stricter loan-to-value ratios for new mortgages; more financial support for new building projects; and increasing the availability and affordability of locations for residential constructions. Measures to develop the private rental market could also be beneficial. Investments in the expansion of the electricity transmission and distribution grids could unlock additional investments in low-carbon, residential construction.

Graph 2.4: **Selected graphs, The Netherlands**



Source: Eurostat, Ameco, ECB and European Commission calculations.

Table 2.2: **Selected economic and financial indicators (Part 1), The Netherlands**

all variables y-o-y % change, unless otherwise stated	2003-07	2008-12	2013-19	2020	2021	2022	2023	forecast	
								2024	2025
Real GDP	2.3	0.0	2.1	-3.9	6.2	4.3	0.1	1.1	1.7
<i>p.m.: Real GDP (Winter 2024 interim Forecast)</i>							0.2	0.4	1.6
Contribution to GDP growth:									
Domestic demand	1.9	-0.7	1.9	-2.9	3.8	3.5	1.3	1.0	1.5
Inventories	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.8	0.4	-0.2	-0.7	0.1	0.0
Net exports	0.3	0.8	0.0	-0.1	2.0	1.0	-0.6	0.0	0.3
Output gap (2)	-0.8	-1.1	-0.3	-4.4	-0.3	1.7	0.1	-0.8	-1.0
Unemployment rate	5.7	5.8	6.4	4.9	4.2	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.9
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP)	1.7	1.9	1.0	1.1	2.8	11.6	4.1	3.7	2.0
<i>p.m.: HICP (Winter 2024 interim Forecast)</i>								2.6	2.0
HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food (y-o-y)	1.2	1.7	1.1	2.1	1.6	5.5	7.4	3.6	2.3
GDP deflator	2.0	1.0	2.1	1.9	2.9	5.5	7.6	3.7	2.3
External position									
Current account balance (% of GDP), balance of payments	7.7	7.2	7.7	5.1	12.1	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.2
Trade balance (% of GDP), balance of payments	8.5	8.4	9.9	10.1	11.3	10.8	.	.	.
Primary income balance (% of GDP)	1.0	0.4	-1.3	-3.3	1.6	-0.9	.	.	.
Secondary income balance (% of GDP)	-1.8	-1.6	-1.0	-1.7	-0.7	-0.6	.	.	.
Current account explained by fundamentals (CA norm, % of GDP) (3)	2.2	2.8	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6
Required current account to stabilise NIIP above -35% of GDP over 20Y (% of GDP) (4)	-0.1	0.4	2.8	5.2	3.9	2.6	2.3	2.4	0.0
Capital account balance (% of GDP)	-0.4	-0.3	-0.1	0.0	0.1	11.1	.	.	.
Net international investment position (% of GDP)	-5.2	10.3	64.1	113.0	93.3	75.2	.	.	.
NENDI - NIIP excluding non-defaultable instruments (% of GDP) (5)	-67.4	-73.2	-28.4	10.3	21.4	18.5	.	.	.
Net FDI flows (% of GDP)	4.6	5.8	4.3	-8.6	14.2	13.6	.	.	.
Competitiveness									
Unit labour costs (ULC, whole economy)	0.8	2.3	1.7	8.1	-2.0	3.6	7.2	5.0	2.5
Nominal compensation per employee	2.3	2.2	1.4	4.3	2.1	4.0	5.7	5.5	3.9
Labour productivity (real, hours worked)	1.6	0.2	0.2	0.1	2.8	0.4	-1.5	0.2	1.0
Real effective exchange rate (ULC)	-0.2	0.3	-0.3	3.5	-2.2	-0.1	0.4	0.9	-0.1
Real effective exchange rate (HICP)	0.6	-0.5	0.8	1.4	0.2	1.9	.	.	.
Export performance vs. advanced countries (% change over 5 years)	.	-1.0	-3.3	6.9	7.6	3.7	.	.	.
Private sector debt									
Private sector debt, consolidated (% of GDP)	228.5	243.3	250.7	233.1	223.7	210.1	193.3	.	.
Household debt, consolidated (% of GDP)	106.6	116.6	107.3	103.8	98.9	92.4	86.8	.	.
Household debt, fundamental benchmark (% of GDP) (6)	49.1	51.0	58.9	65.5	66.8	67.9	69.5	.	.
Household debt, prudential threshold (% of GDP) (6)	40.2	45.0	49.8	51.1	48.6	47.3	47.2	.	.
Non-financial corporate debt, consolidated (% of GDP)	121.9	126.7	143.3	129.3	124.9	117.7	106.6	.	.
Corporate debt, fundamental benchmark (% of GDP) (6)	106.7	96.0	94.7	101.0	102.6	104.2	107.0	.	.
Corporate debt, prudential threshold (% of GDP) (6)	62.3	68.0	76.3	81.8	76.1	74.1	75.0	.	.
Private credit flow, consolidated (% of GDP)	11.8	7.6	2.7	-0.7	9.6	6.9	6.2e	.	.
Household credit flow, consolidated (% of credit stock)	6.8	2.5	1.0	2.0	4.0	2.8	.	.	.
Non-financial corporate credit flow, consolidated (% of credit stock)	9.1	11.9	2.9	-4.2	8.5	6.4	.	.	.
Net savings rate of households (% of net disposable income)	3.4	6.9	10.4	18.8	17.0	12.7	.	.	.

(e) Estimate based on ECB quarterly data

(1) Potential output is the highest level of production that an economy can reach without generating inflationary pressures. The methodology to compute the potential output is based on K. Havik, K. Mc Morrow, F. Orlandi, C. Planas, R. Raciborski, W. Roeger, A. Rossi, A. Thum-Thysen, V. Vandermeulen, 'The Production Function Methodology for Calculating Potential Growth Rates & Output Gaps', COM, European Economy, Economic Papers 535, November 2014.

(2) Deviation of actual output from potential output as % of potential GDP.

(3) Current accounts in line with fundamentals ('current account norms') are derived from reduced-form regressions capturing the main determinants of the saving-investment balance, including fundamental determinants, policy factors and global financial conditions. See L. Coutinho et al. (2018), 'Methodologies for the assessment of current account benchmarks', European Economy, Discussion Paper 86/2018, for details.

(4) This benchmark is defined as the average current account required to reach and stabilise the NIIP at -35% of GDP over the next 20 years. Calculations make use of the Commission's T+10 projections.

(5) NENDI is a subset of the NIIP that abstracts from its pure equity-related components, i.e. foreign direct investment (FDI) equity and equity shares, and from intracompany cross-border FDI debt, and represents the NIIP excluding instruments that cannot be subject to default.

(6) Fundamental benchmarks are derived from regressions capturing the main determinants of credit growth and taking into account a given initial stock of debt. Prudential thresholds identify a threshold above which banking crises become more likely. The fundamentals-based and the prudential benchmarks are calculated following Bricongne, J. C., Coutinho, L., Turrini, A., Zeugner, S. (2019), 'Is Private Debt Excessive?', Open Economies Review, 1- 42.

Source: Eurostat and ECB as of 20 February 2024, where available; European Commission for forecast figures (Autumn Forecast 2023).

Table 2.2: **Selected economic and financial indicators (Part 2), The Netherlands**

all variables y-o-y % change, unless otherwise stated	2003-07	2008-12	2013-19	2020	2021	2022	2023	forecast	
								2024	2025
Housing market									
House price index, nominal	4.1	-2.6	5.6	7.6	15.0	13.4	.	.	.
House price index, deflated	2.0	-3.7	4.2	6.2	11.6	6.1	.	.	.
Overvaluation gap (%) (7)	12.8	7.9	-6.5	7.0	16.7	23.6	17.0	.	.
Price-to-income overvaluation gap (%) (8)	11.5	4.9	-4.9	8.5	18.7	24.6	11.9	.	.
Residential investment (% of GDP)	5.9	4.8	4.2	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.1	.	.
Government debt									
General government balance (% of GDP)	-1.1	-3.8	0.1	-3.7	-2.2	-0.1	-0.5	-1.8	-2.0
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	47.7	59.7	58.7	54.7	51.7	50.1	47.1	46.6	46.8
Banking sector									
Return on equity (%)	.	1.4	7.3	3.2	8.7	7.9	.	.	.
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio	.	11.5	17.5	19.3	19.3	18.0	.	.	.
Gross non-performing debt (% of total debt instruments and total loans and advances) (9)	.	2.4	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.2	.	.	.
Gross non-performing loans (% of gross loans) (9)	.	.	2.4	1.9	1.4	1.3	1.3	.	.
Cost of borrowing for corporations (%)	4.3	3.1	1.5	1.3	0.8	3.0	4.5	.	.
Cost of borrowing for households for house purchase (%)	4.4	4.6	2.5	1.8	1.7	3.4	4.1	.	.

(7) Unweighted average of price-to-income, price-to-rent and model valuation gaps. The model valuation gap is estimated in a cointegration framework using a system of five fundamental variables: total population, real housing stock, real disposable income per capita, real long-term interest rate and price deflator of final consumption expenditure, based on Philipponnet, N., Turrini, A. (2017), 'Assessing House Price Developments in the EU', European Economy - Discussion Papers 2015 - 048, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission. Price-to-income and price-to-rent gaps are measured as the deviation from the long term average (from 1995 to the latest available year).

(8) Price-to-income overvaluation gap measured as the deviation from the long term average (from 1995 to the latest available year).

(9) Domestic banking groups and stand-alone banks, EU and non-EU foreign-controlled subsidiaries and EU and non-EU foreign-controlled branches.

Source: Eurostat and ECB as of 2024-02-20, where available; European Commission for forecast figures (Autumn Forecast 2023).

EUROPEAN ECONOMY INSTITUTIONAL PAPERS SERIES

European Economy Institutional Papers series can be accessed and downloaded free of charge from the following address: [Publications \(europa.eu\)](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/index_en.htm).

Titles published before July 2015 can be accessed and downloaded free of charge from:

- http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/index_en.htm
(the main reports, e.g. Economic Forecasts)
- http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/index_en.htm
(the Occasional Papers)
- http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/qr_euro_area/index_en.htm
(the Quarterly Reports on the Euro Area)

GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU

In person

All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct Information Centres. You can find the address of the centre nearest you at: <http://europa.eu/contact>.

On the phone or by e-mail

Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service:

- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls),
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or
- by electronic mail via: <http://europa.eu/contact>.

FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU

Online

Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: <http://europa.eu>.

EU Publications

You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: <http://publications.europa.eu/bookshop>. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see <http://europa.eu/contact>).

EU law and related documents

For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu>.

Open data from the EU

The EU Open Data Portal (<http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data>) provides access to datasets from the EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for free, both for commercial and non-commercial purposes.

